July 30, 2026 St. Petersburg and Florida Legal Update:
Property Taxes, Pinellas Civil Rights, Insurance, Supreme Court Petitions, and New Laws
Several significant legal developments arrived at once this week, including three matters with direct Pinellas County or St. Petersburg connections. A Leon County judge heard challenges to Florida’s proposed property-tax constitutional amendment, a Pinellas County judge decided the closely watched Waddles pig case, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit revived portions of a South St. Petersburg nonprofit’s constitutional lawsuit against Pinellas County.
Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal also issued an important written decision concerning automobile-insurance coverage and attorney-fee exposure. At the national level, a new petition asks the United States Supreme Court to consider presidential immunity and the federal Westfall Act in the E. Jean Carroll defamation litigation.
Finally, several recently enacted Florida laws could materially affect local governments, property owners, developers, religious institutions, affordable-housing projects, contractors, and businesses.
This Florida legal update for July 2026 explains what the courts and Legislature have actually done, what remains unresolved, and why those distinctions matter.
For additional local developments involving St. Petersburg infrastructure, elections, property taxes, and court decisions, see our July 29, 2026 St. Petersburg and Florida Legal Update.
At a Glance
The principal developments are:
- A Leon County judge heard three consolidated challenges to the ballot language for Florida’s proposed property-tax Amendment 3 but did not immediately rule.
- SPCA Tampa Bay was found not guilty of the civil animal-cruelty citation arising from the treatment of Waddles the pig.
- The Eleventh Circuit reinstated First Amendment and equal-protection claims brought by a South St. Petersburg nonprofit against Pinellas County.
- The Second District held that Progressive’s automobile policy did not cover a proposal-for-settlement attorney-fee judgment entered against its insured.
- President Donald Trump filed a new Supreme Court petition challenging the $83.3 million defamation judgment entered in favor of E. Jean Carroll.
- Florida enacted new property-tax administration, affordable-housing, and land-development laws with different effective dates and implementation requirements.
These developments involve different procedural stages. A bench-trial ruling is not the same as a published appellate opinion. An appellate decision reversing dismissal does not establish that the plaintiff has proven its allegations. A petition asking the Supreme Court to hear a case is not a Supreme Court decision. Likewise, legislation implementing a proposed constitutional amendment does not mean voters have approved the amendment itself.
That procedural precision is essential to understanding each development.
Florida Property-Tax Amendment Faces Ballot-Language Challenges
On July 29, 2026, Leon County Circuit Judge David Frank heard approximately two hours of argument in three consolidated lawsuits challenging the title and ballot summary for Florida’s proposed property-tax Amendment 3.
The consolidated cases were brought by Save Our Voters from Misleading Ballot Language, Inc. and individual voters; former South Miami Mayor Philip Stoddard; and former Florida Senator Jeff Brandes and former Congressman Al Lawson Jr. The Florida Department of State and Florida Attorney General are defending the ballot language.
The Florida Channel’s complete video of the July 29 hearing identifies the three cases and provides the best available opportunity for members of the public to hear the parties’ arguments directly. The Florida Department of State’s constitutional-amendment database also contains the official title, summary, status, and ballot number for Amendment 3.
The challengers contend that the title—“Save Our Homes from Excessive Property Taxes”—and portions of the summary improperly promote the amendment instead of neutrally advising voters what it would do. They particularly object to language describing the measure as benefiting taxpayers, protecting small businesses, ensuring fairness, and preserving funding for core services.
The State maintains that the title and summary accurately describe the Legislature’s proposal and that ballot language does not have to identify every possible fiscal or policy consequence. The controlling legal question is not merely whether different language could have been written. The issue is whether the language presented to voters is misleading or clearly and conclusively defective under Florida law.
Judge Frank did not rule from the bench. He directed the parties to submit proposed orders by August 3, meaning the amendment remained pending before the circuit court as of this article’s publication. WPTV’s report on the hearing provides an additional summary of the parties’ competing arguments and the schedule set by the court.
Any circuit-court decision may also be followed by expedited appellate review because state and local election officials need adequate time to prepare ballots for the November election.
What Amendment 3 would do
The official amendment materials describe a proposal that would increase the homestead exemption from non-school property taxation, limit future assessment increases on certain non-homestead property, and restrict how counties and municipalities use remaining ad valorem tax revenue.
The complete proposal originated in CS/HJR 1-F, with a substantively corresponding Senate proposal appearing in CS/SJR 2-F. The Florida Department of State has designated the proposal as 2026 Constitutional Amendment 3.
If approved, the amendment would take effect January 1, 2027. As with most amendments to the Florida Constitution, it must receive at least 60% of the votes cast on the measure. That requirement appears in Article XI, section 5 of the Florida Constitution.
Readers seeking a broader explanation of the state constitution, its structure, and the amendment process may review our overview of the Florida Constitution.
Why the ballot wording matters
Florida voters ordinarily encounter a proposed constitutional amendment through its ballot title and summary rather than through the complete legal text. The title and summary therefore perform an unusually important gatekeeping function. They must be concise enough to appear on the ballot but sufficiently accurate to allow voters to understand the proposal’s chief purpose.
Florida courts have repeatedly explained that ballot summaries must provide fair notice of an amendment’s principal effect and may not affirmatively mislead voters. The constitutional and statutory standards are intended to protect the integrity of the electoral process, even though a ballot summary is not required to explain every possible consequence or hypothetical application.
The present dispute therefore raises a broader institutional question: When does a ballot summary stop describing a proposal and begin campaigning for it?
Our earlier article, July 29, 2026 St. Petersburg and Florida Legal Update, examines the amendment’s substantive provisions, its possible effects on local-government revenue, and its interaction with St. Petersburg’s proposed infrastructure bond referendum.
An implementing property-tax law has already taken effect
The Florida Legislature separately enacted CS/SB 4-F, which became Chapter 2026-240, Laws of Florida. The statute addresses property-tax administration, maximum millage calculations, revenue limitations, and related implementation issues. It also permits the ballot summary for the specified constitutional proposal to exceed the usual statutory word limit.
The implementing legislation took effect on June 24, 2026. The statute is already law. The constitutional amendment is not.
Voters must still decide whether to approve the constitutional changes themselves. The pending litigation concerns what those voters will be told when they make that decision.
SPCA Tampa Bay Found Not Guilty in Waddles the Pig Case
A Pinellas County judge found SPCA Tampa Bay not guilty on July 29 after a bench trial concerning a civil animal-cruelty citation involving Waddles, a pot-bellied pig that had been placed in the shelter’s care.
The case attracted substantial public attention after photographs and videos showed Waddles with serious skin injuries and other apparent medical problems. Pinellas County alleged that the shelter failed to provide adequate access to shade or shelter and that Waddles suffered a severe sunburn while in its care.
The trial court nevertheless concluded that the County had not proven the charged violation. According to reports from the hearing, veterinary records indicated that someone observed possible sunburn at approximately 7:23 a.m., while the investigating officer placed the relevant time at approximately 12:45 p.m. The court found that the evidence did not adequately establish when the injury occurred or connect the timing of the injury to the specific conduct alleged in the citation.
Local accounts of the evidence and ruling are available from FOX 13 Tampa Bay, 10 Tampa Bay, and ABC Action News.
Florida and Pinellas County animal-protection laws
Florida’s general animal-cruelty statute, section 828.12, Florida Statutes, prohibits conduct including unnecessarily depriving an animal of necessary sustenance or shelter and causing unnecessary pain or suffering. Florida law also authorizes local governments to enact and enforce local animal-control and animal-cruelty ordinances.
Pinellas County Animal Services states that its enforcement responsibilities include animal cruelty, animal hoarding, dangerous animals, nuisance animals, tethering, and other animal-welfare concerns. The County maintains an Animal Services Enforcement page explaining those responsibilities and provides online access to the Pinellas County Code of Ordinances.
The Waddles proceeding involved a civil citation, not a criminal prosecution under section 828.12. That procedural distinction matters when evaluating the possible penalties, applicable evidentiary issues, and legal consequences of the court’s ruling.
What the Waddles decision means
The ruling means the government did not carry its burden of proving the civil citation at trial. It does not necessarily establish that:
- Waddles was never injured;
- every shelter policy or procedure was adequate;
- every person involved acted properly;
- no improvements should be made to animal-care protocols; or
- public concern about Waddles was illegitimate.
The result instead illustrates a basic principle that applies across criminal, civil, administrative, and code-enforcement proceedings: visible harm does not, by itself, establish who legally caused it, when it occurred, or whether every required element of the charged violation has been proven.
Evidence must establish more than a troubling result
Courts generally require evidence connecting the alleged wrongdoing to the defendant and to the specific charge. That may require reliable records, a defensible timeline, competent witnesses, expert testimony, photographs with verifiable dates, preserved communications, and evidence of causation.
An injury can be undisputed while responsibility for that injury remains contested. Similarly, public suspicion may be understandable even though the evidence presented at trial does not satisfy the government’s legal burden.
This is particularly important for nonprofit organizations, veterinary facilities, shelters, health-care providers, contractors, property managers, assisted-living facilities, childcare providers, and other organizations responsible for people, animals, or property. An institution may face both legal and reputational exposure even when the government cannot ultimately prove a citation.
Businesses and nonprofits should maintain contemporaneous incident reports, care records, photographs, witness information, surveillance footage, internal communications, inspection records, and written policies. Those materials can be essential if an emotionally charged controversy later becomes a legal proceeding.
Our firm assists organizations and individuals with serious disputes through its Florida civil-litigation practice and represents businesses and nonprofit interests through its business-law services.
Eleventh Circuit Revives Constitutional Claims Against Pinellas County
The most significant new published local appellate decision is African People’s Education and Defense Fund, Inc. v. Pinellas County, Case No. 24-13547.
On July 29, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the nonprofit’s First Amendment retaliation and equal-protection claims while affirming dismissal of its procedural-due-process claim. The complete published Eleventh Circuit opinion is available directly from the court. The Eleventh Circuit’s published-opinion database identifies the decision as issued July 29, 2026.
The African People’s Education and Defense Fund, or APEDF, is a nonprofit organization operating in South St. Petersburg. According to the complaint, APEDF applied for federal COVID-relief grant funds administered through Pinellas County.
APEDF alleged that a private foundation reviewing the applications ranked its requests highly and recommended funding. The County initially approved one grant but later withdrew it, and it denied a second grant application. APEDF alleged that those actions resulted from racial discrimination and retaliation based upon its expressive association with the Uhuru Movement.
Pinellas County disputed the claims, and the federal district court dismissed all three constitutional counts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a legally sufficient claim. The current federal rules are also available in the official Federal Rules of Civil Procedure publication.
First Amendment retaliation claim may proceed
The Eleventh Circuit held that APEDF had sufficiently alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim to survive dismissal. The court rejected the argument that a new applicant for a government grant necessarily lacks First Amendment protection merely because it did not already have a contractual relationship with the government.
The appellate court reasoned that the County was distributing a public benefit rather than acting in the traditional role of an employer or contracting partner. Under the allegations accepted at the pleading stage, APEDF plausibly claimed that it suffered an adverse funding decision because of its expressive association with a disfavored organization.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects speech, assembly, petition, religious exercise, and related associational rights. Constitutional claims against state and local government actors are frequently brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil cause of action for certain deprivations of federal constitutional or statutory rights under color of state law.
Equal-protection claim may also proceed
The Eleventh Circuit also reinstated APEDF’s equal-protection claim. The court concluded that a corporation or nonprofit does not have to possess a racial identity in precisely the same manner as a natural person to challenge intentional discrimination directed at its leadership, employees, mission, or the community it serves.
APEDF alleged that it was Black-led, served predominantly Black residents, and was treated less favorably than similarly situated organizations serving predominantly white communities. Those allegations were sufficient to pass the motion-to-dismiss stage.
The Equal Protection Clause appears in section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Its application frequently requires courts to examine governmental intent, differential treatment, comparator evidence, and the justification offered for a challenged decision.
Procedural-due-process claim remains dismissed
The court agreed with the district court that APEDF had not established a protected property interest sufficient to support its procedural-due-process count. An expectation of receiving discretionary grant funding is not necessarily a vested legal entitlement.
The result is therefore mixed: the First Amendment and equal-protection claims return to the district court, while the procedural-due-process claim remains dismissed.
The court did not find Pinellas County liable
This distinction is critical. The Eleventh Circuit did not decide that Pinellas County discriminated or retaliated against APEDF.
Because the case reached the appellate court following dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court was required to accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences in APEDF’s favor. The question was whether the complaint alleged legally sufficient claims, not whether APEDF had already proven those claims with admissible evidence.
The decision means the allegations were sufficient to permit the First Amendment and equal-protection claims to proceed into further litigation. Pinellas County may continue to dispute the allegations, conduct discovery, introduce evidence, assert defenses, seek summary judgment, and present its position at trial if the claims remain pending.
Readers interested in that procedural distinction may review our explanation of the Florida civil-litigation process and our broader civil-litigation practice. Although APEDF is a federal case, the distinction between allegations, motions to dismiss, discovery, summary judgment, and trial is important in both federal and state litigation.
Lessons for local governments and grant administrators
The decision provides several practical lessons for public bodies:
- Establish objective grant criteria before controversy arises.
- Apply those criteria consistently among similarly situated applicants.
- Preserve records explaining the reasons for each funding decision.
- Provide accurate notice when an approved or recommended grant will be reconsidered.
- Avoid informal texts, emails, or public statements suggesting that race, political activity, or protected association drove the decision.
- Ensure that stated reasons remain consistent from the initial review through litigation.
- Train elected officials, staff members, committee members, and outside administrators regarding constitutional limits on discretionary decision-making.
- Consider whether public statements or communications could later be characterized as evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory intent.
For nonprofits and businesses seeking government benefits, the case also demonstrates the value of preserving application scores, recommendations, communications, meeting agendas, recordings, comparator information, internal memoranda, and explanations for changed decisions.
Government funding may be discretionary, but governmental discretion does not permit unconstitutional discrimination or retaliation.
Organizations facing grant, contracting, ownership, governance, or commercial disputes may learn more about our business and commercial litigation services.
Second District Addresses Insurance Coverage for Proposal-for-Settlement Fees
The Second District Court of Appeal—which hears appeals from Pinellas, Hillsborough, Pasco, Manatee, and several surrounding counties—issued a substituted written opinion in Hurst, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Howard Mathews v. Bell, Case No. 2D2025-0645.
The case arose from an automobile collision. Progressive insured the defendant under a policy providing $100,000 in bodily-injury coverage per person and $300,000 per accident. Before suit, Progressive tendered the $100,000 per-person policy limit, but the injured claimant rejected the tender.
After litigation began, the claimant served a $160,000 proposal for settlement. The proposal was not accepted, the case proceeded to trial, and the court ultimately entered both a damages judgment and a separate attorney-fee and cost judgment against the insured.
The fee judgment was based on Florida’s offer-of-judgment and proposal-for-settlement statute, section 768.79, Florida Statutes. That statute can create attorney-fee exposure when a qualifying settlement proposal is rejected and the ultimate judgment satisfies the applicable statutory threshold.
The claimant’s estate then sought to join Progressive to the attorney-fee judgment under Florida’s nonjoinder statute, section 627.4136, Florida Statutes. That statute generally restricts when a liability insurer may be joined to litigation against its insured but permits joinder in certain circumstances after a judgment or settlement.
The complete Second District opinion in Hurst v. Bell explains the policy language, underlying litigation, fee judgment, and attempted joinder of Progressive.
The insurance policy did not cover the attorney-fee judgment
The Second District affirmed the denial of joinder because Progressive’s policy expressly excluded attorney’s fees awarded or assessed against the insured.
The court distinguished the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Macedo, which involved materially different insurance-policy language. The policy in Macedo was ambiguous about whether an adverse attorney-fee award qualified as an expense or cost covered by the insurer. The Florida Supreme Court construed that ambiguity in favor of coverage. Progressive’s policy, by contrast, expressly addressed and excluded the relevant category of attorney’s fees.
Why the decision matters to accident defendants and plaintiffs
Many insured drivers understandably assume that their automobile insurer will pay every judgment, cost, or fee arising from a covered accident. That assumption may be incorrect.
An insurance company’s duty to defend and its obligation to pay covered damages do not necessarily extend to every attorney-fee award entered against the insured. The outcome depends heavily on:
- the exact policy language;
- the nature of the underlying claim;
- the basis for the fee award;
- the insurer’s settlement conduct;
- the amount of available insurance;
- the timing and terms of any settlement proposal;
- whether coverage was accepted, denied, or provided subject to a reservation of rights; and
- whether separate coverage or insurer-conduct claims may exist.
The decision also underscores the risks associated with proposals for settlement under section 768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. A proposal for settlement is not merely an informal settlement demand. When properly served and followed by a sufficiently favorable judgment, it can create substantial attorney-fee exposure.
For injured persons, defendants, and businesses, the legal analysis should include:
- the available insurance limits;
- the complete policy, including exclusions and supplementary-payment provisions;
- prior tenders or settlement offers;
- the amount and timing of a proposal for settlement;
- the likelihood of satisfying the statutory judgment threshold;
- whether the insurer or insured controls settlement decisions;
- potential personal exposure beyond insurance coverage;
- the collectability of any excess judgment;
- whether the insurer adequately communicated settlement opportunities; and
- whether separate claims involving coverage or insurer conduct may exist.
Additional information is available through our personal-injury practice page, our guide explaining what to do after a Florida car accident, and our Florida civil-litigation practice.
New Supreme Court Petition Raises Presidential-Immunity and Westfall Act Questions
President Donald Trump has filed a new petition asking the United States Supreme Court to review the $83.3 million defamation judgment entered in favor of E. Jean Carroll.
A federal jury awarded Carroll $18.3 million in compensatory damages and $65 million in punitive damages based primarily on statements Trump made in 2019 while serving as President. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment. The Second Circuit subsequently declined to rehear the case en banc, with separate judges writing opinions agreeing or disagreeing with the panel’s treatment of presidential immunity and federal substitution. The complete en banc rehearing order and opinions provide important context for the new petition.
The newly filed petition reportedly asks the Supreme Court to consider three principal questions:
- Whether presidential immunity can be waived or forfeited when it was not raised in the first responsive pleading.
- Whether a President’s responses to press questions concerning fitness for office constitute official acts protected by presidential immunity.
- Whether the United States should be substituted as the defendant under the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, commonly called the Westfall Act.
A publicly available copy of the new Supreme Court petition sets out the arguments advanced by Trump’s counsel. The Associated Press has also published a summary of Trump’s petition and the Justice Department’s position.
The Supreme Court’s official docket should remain the controlling source for the filing date, case number, response deadline, briefing, and any eventual order once the new matter is formally docketed.
What Westfall Act substitution could mean
The Westfall Act is codified principally at 28 U.S.C. § 2679. It generally provides that when a federal employee is sued for certain common-law torts based on conduct within the scope of federal employment, the United States may be substituted for the individual defendant.
Substitution would be particularly consequential in a defamation case because the Federal Tort Claims Act generally excludes claims arising from libel and slander. That exception appears in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
Trump and the federal government therefore argue that if his responses were within the scope of presidential duties, personal liability should not remain against him. Carroll’s position, as reflected in the prior litigation, is that Trump is personally responsible for defamatory statements and that immunity or substitution defenses were unavailable, waived, forfeited, or properly rejected.
The Supreme Court has not resolved those questions in this case.
The petition is not a Supreme Court ruling
Filing a petition for a writ of certiorari does not mean the Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal. The Court may:
- request or receive a response;
- distribute the petition for conference;
- grant the petition;
- deny the petition;
- hold the petition while another matter is decided;
- request the views of the Solicitor General; or
- request additional briefing.
The Supreme Court’s own Guide for Prospective Indigent Petitioners and Rules of the Supreme Court explain that certiorari review is discretionary and is granted in only a limited number of cases.
Unless and until certiorari is granted, the Second Circuit’s decision remains the controlling judgment in the litigation.
This is different from the earlier $5 million Carroll case
The current petition concerns the separate $83.3 million verdict based principally on statements made in 2019.
Trump previously sought Supreme Court review of a separate $5 million judgment involving Carroll. The official docket for that matter is Trump v. Carroll, Supreme Court Case No. 25-573. The Supreme Court denied that petition on June 29, 2026, although a petition for rehearing was subsequently filed.
The denial of certiorari in the earlier case did not itself decide the issues raised in the new petition. A denial of certiorari ordinarily does not constitute an endorsement of the lower court’s reasoning or establish a nationwide merits precedent. It means the Court declined to review that particular judgment.
The new petition nevertheless faces an uncertain path. It asks the Court to revisit issues arising from different statements, a different judgment, presidential-immunity arguments, questions of waiver or forfeiture, and the federal government’s requested substitution.
Florida Enacts New Property-Tax Administration Law
As discussed above, CS/SB 4-F became Chapter 2026-240 and took effect June 24, 2026.
Among other things, the law:
- revises calculations governing maximum county and municipal millage rates;
- uses the rolled-back rate in determining certain maximum millage limitations;
- addresses property-tax revenue reductions for fiscally constrained counties;
- provides for certain revenue-loss offsets; and
- permits the ballot summary for the specified 2026 property-tax constitutional amendment to exceed the ordinary statutory word limit.
The law is closely connected to the proposed property-tax amendment but remains legally distinct from it. The Legislature has enacted an administrative framework; voters must still decide whether to approve the constitutional changes.
Property owners and local governments should also distinguish among changes affecting:
- assessed value;
- homestead exemptions;
- non-homestead assessment limitations;
- millage rates;
- rolled-back rates;
- property-tax notices;
- local-government revenue;
- permissible uses of revenue; and
- voter approval of a constitutional amendment.
Those concepts interact, but they are not interchangeable.
HB 1389 Expands Florida’s Affordable-Housing and Live Local Framework
CS/CS/HB 1389 became Chapter 2026-179 and took effect July 1, 2026. The law makes significant changes to Florida’s Live Local Act and related affordable-housing procedures. The Florida Senate has also published a detailed HB 1389 bill summary.
Among its principal provisions, the law extends certain Live Local development preemptions to qualifying property owned by:
- a county;
- a municipality;
- a school district; or
- a religious institution owning more than three acres on which a house of public worship has existed for at least ten years.
The law also limits the ability of local governments to use setbacks, stepbacks, or similar dimensional requirements as indirect height restrictions on qualifying developments.
It addresses parcel assemblages, airport areas, affordable-housing tax exemptions, military-family housing incentives, development applications, property eligibility, and other approval requirements.
Religious institutions and government-owned property
HB 1389 could create new opportunities for religious institutions and public entities that own underutilized land. A qualifying church, synagogue, mosque, temple, school district, county, or municipality may be able to use or partner concerning property that previously faced substantial local zoning obstacles.
That does not mean every religious or government-owned property automatically qualifies. Eligibility may depend upon acreage, ownership, existing uses, the duration of a house of worship’s presence, affordability commitments, location, airport restrictions, conservation limitations, and other statutory requirements.
Property owners and potential development partners should therefore review the complete statute and project facts before assuming the Live Local Act applies.
Financing discrimination and governmental liability
HB 1389 also clarifies that prohibited discrimination in land-use decisions may include discrimination based on the source of financing for an affordable-housing development. The legislation includes a waiver of sovereign immunity for claims based upon specified prohibited discrimination in land-use or permitting decisions.
That provision could become particularly significant in disputes involving:
- tax-credit financing;
- government-assisted affordable housing;
- nonprofit housing providers;
- religious institutions;
- local development approvals;
- unequal permitting requirements;
- conditions imposed because of project financing; and
- delays or denials allegedly based upon the nature of the proposed residents or funding.
The statute does not guarantee approval of every housing proposal. Applicants must still establish that a project satisfies the applicable statutory criteria, and disputes will likely arise over property eligibility, affordability periods, height, density, mixed-use requirements, exclusions, financing, and procedural compliance.
Developers, property owners, churches, nonprofits, and local governments should evaluate a proposed project before assuming that traditional zoning restrictions continue to control.
Our firm assists businesses and property owners through its commercial real-estate practice, business-law services, and business and commercial litigation practice.
HB 399 Changes Florida Land-Use and Development Regulation
CS/CS/CS/HB 399 became Chapter 2026-7. The law generally took effect on March 27, 2026, although several important provisions do not become effective until January 1, 2027. The Florida Senate’s HB 399 bill summary provides a detailed description of the enacted changes.
Beginning January 1, 2027, the law will require development-permit and development-order application fees to bear a reasonable relationship to the local government’s cost of reviewing, processing, and finally deciding the application. It also prohibits certain fees calculated as a percentage of construction costs, site costs, or project valuation.
The law establishes more objective requirements for decisions based on “compatibility.” Local governments must incorporate compatibility factors and objective design or mitigation standards into their comprehensive plans and land-development regulations.
Before recommending denial on compatibility grounds, staff may be required to identify the asserted incompatibilities and consider whether reasonable mitigation measures could address them. A final denial must include written findings identifying the areas of incompatibility and explaining why proposed or reasonably available mitigation would be inadequate.
Why written findings matter
A generalized statement that a project is “incompatible” may provide little meaningful information to the applicant, surrounding owners, reviewing officials, or a court. Requiring written findings and identifiable standards can improve transparency and permit more effective administrative or judicial review.
For applicants, written findings may reveal whether a dispute concerns height, scale, traffic, drainage, access, noise, design, density, public services, neighboring uses, or another measurable factor.
For local governments, written findings can demonstrate that a decision resulted from adopted standards rather than personal preference, political pressure, or an unannounced policy.
Off-site construction and manufactured housing
HB 399 also requires greater regulatory parity between qualifying off-site constructed residential dwellings and comparable homes built on-site. A local government generally may not exclude a qualifying dwelling merely because components were constructed somewhere else.
Those provisions may affect:
- modular-home companies;
- manufactured-building companies;
- residential developers;
- property owners seeking lower-cost construction options;
- local governments;
- mobile-home and recreational-vehicle communities;
- contractors;
- lenders;
- insurers; and
- buyers evaluating whether a structure complies with local and state requirements.
The delayed effective date gives local governments time to revise fee schedules, comprehensive plans, development regulations, review procedures, application forms, and written decision practices. It also gives applicants and property owners time to identify local provisions that may become inconsistent with state law.
For broader coverage of recently enacted legislation, see our article on new Florida laws effective July 1, 2026.
What These Developments Have in Common
At first glance, an injured pig, a nonprofit grant dispute, an automobile-insurance policy, a presidential defamation case, and affordable-housing legislation may appear unrelated.
Legally, however, each illustrates the importance of identifying the precise question being decided.
In the Waddles case, the question was not merely whether the photographs were troubling. It was whether the County proved the charged civil violation.
In the APEDF case, the question was not whether Pinellas County had already been proven liable. It was whether the nonprofit alleged sufficient facts to proceed beyond dismissal.
In Hurst, the question was not whether the insured faced an attorney-fee judgment. It was whether the insurance contract covered that particular judgment.
In the Carroll litigation, the current question is whether the Supreme Court will agree to review the judgment—not whether the Court has accepted or decided the asserted immunity and substitution arguments.
In the property-tax litigation, the question is not yet whether voters should support or oppose the amendment. It is whether the ballot title and summary fairly and accurately advise voters what they are being asked to approve.
And with the new Florida laws, the relevant questions include not only what the Legislature enacted, but when each provision takes effect, which properties and projects qualify, which standards apply, and how state preemption interacts with local regulation.
Practical Steps for Florida Residents, Businesses, and Organizations
Property owners
Review how the proposed constitutional amendment, existing homestead protections, local millage rates, non-homestead assessment rules, and any St. Petersburg bond referendum could separately affect your property.
Do not assume that a larger exemption or lower assessment cap will produce the same result for every owner or property. The effect may differ based on assessed value, taxable value, portability, exemptions, ownership, residency, millage rates, and whether the property is homestead, commercial, residential rental, or another non-homestead classification.
Nonprofits
Preserve grant applications, scoring materials, written recommendations, meeting notices, emails, text messages, funding criteria, comparator information, internal memoranda, and explanations for altered decisions.
Government benefits may be discretionary, but public entities generally may not make decisions based on unconstitutional discrimination or retaliation.
Insured drivers and accident defendants
Obtain and review the complete insurance policy rather than relying solely on the declarations page. Pay particular attention to exclusions, supplementary payments, defense provisions, settlement authority, cooperation clauses, attorney-fee provisions, coverage limits, and reservation-of-rights communications.
Injured persons
Do not assume that an insurer’s policy limit necessarily represents the maximum possible recovery or that every judgment against the insured will be covered. The available recovery may depend upon multiple insurance policies, responsible parties, available assets, coverage defenses, settlement conduct, and other legal issues.
Our Florida car-accident checklist explains immediate steps for protecting health, evidence, insurance rights, and potential claims.
Businesses
Treat litigation holds and evidence preservation seriously as soon as an incident, citation, demand, claim, investigation, or lawsuit becomes reasonably foreseeable. Contemporaneous evidence is often more persuasive than later recollections.
Businesses should consider preserving:
- emails and text messages;
- contracts and amendments;
- photographs and videos;
- access logs;
- surveillance recordings;
- inspection and maintenance records;
- personnel files;
- customer communications;
- incident reports;
- electronic metadata; and
- relevant social-media content.
Developers and property owners
Evaluate HB 1389 and HB 399 before accepting a local statement that a proposed use is prohibited. State-law preemption, objective compatibility standards, fee restrictions, affordable-housing rights, and off-site construction protections may materially affect the analysis.
Local governments
Begin updating written criteria and procedures before the January 1, 2027 effective date of HB 399’s delayed provisions. Clear standards, consistent treatment, written findings, and preserved decision-making records can reduce uncertainty and litigation exposure.
Florida Legal Issues Frequently Cross Practice Areas
A property-tax question may become a constitutional, real-estate, local-government, business, or estate-planning issue. An automobile accident may implicate personal injury, insurance coverage, civil procedure, settlement strategy, and personal financial exposure. A development dispute may involve zoning, contracts, financing, construction, civil rights, and administrative remedies.
A government-grant dispute can involve nonprofit governance, public records, constitutional rights, administrative procedure, reputational risk, and federal litigation. An animal-care controversy can involve local ordinances, state statutes, licensing, evidence preservation, nonprofit governance, insurance, and crisis communication.
That overlap is why The Law Firm of Douglas G. Jackson, P.A. follows major legal developments beyond a single narrow practice area. Individuals, families, businesses, nonprofits, property owners, and community organizations often need counsel who can identify the complete legal problem before determining the appropriate strategy.
Our firm represents clients in matters involving:
- Florida civil litigation;
- business and commercial litigation;
- business law and ongoing legal counsel;
- commercial real estate;
- personal injury;
- property and contract disputes;
- nonprofit and organizational concerns; and
- related legal matters that cross traditional practice-area boundaries.
For assistance with a Florida civil dispute, business matter, property issue, automobile claim, or related legal concern, contact The Law Firm of Douglas G. Jackson, P.A. at 1-800-704-6045.
Legal Disclaimer
This article is provided for general educational and informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, does not create an attorney-client relationship, and should not be relied upon as a substitute for advice concerning particular facts, documents, deadlines, policies, statutes, insurance contracts, or court proceedings.
Several matters discussed above remain pending and may change after publication. Court petitions and allegations are not judicial findings. A court’s decision at the motion-to-dismiss stage does not establish that the allegations have been proven. Likewise, the filing of a Supreme Court petition does not mean the Supreme Court has agreed to hear or decide the case.
Readers should consult qualified counsel regarding their individual circumstances.
Published July 30, 2026.
